Administrative Law -- Parties on Appeal from Utilities Commission -- Refusal to Take Judicial Notice of Interest of Affected Municipality in Discontinuance of Train Service by Maner, Edwin N., Jr.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 21 | Number 2 Article 5
2-1-1943
Administrative Law -- Parties on Appeal from
Utilities Commission -- Refusal to Take Judicial
Notice of Interest of Affected Municipality in
Discontinuance of Train Service
Edwin N. Maner Jr.
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina Law
Review by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Edwin N. Maner Jr., Administrative Law -- Parties on Appeal from Utilities Commission -- Refusal to Take Judicial Notice of Interest of





VOLUME 21 FEBRUARY, 1943 NUMBER 2
STUDENT BOARD OF EDITORS
JOHN T. KILPATRICK, JR., Editor-in-Chief
FRED R. EDNEY, JR., Associate Editor-in-Chief
H. MILTON SHORT, JR., Associate Editor-in-Chief
JOEL DENTON ARTHUR C. JONES, JR.





M. S. BRECKENRIDGE FRANK W. HANFT
ALBET COATES FREDERICK B. McCALL
JOHN P. DALzEm M. T. VAN HECKE
R. H. WETTACH
Footnotes which contain material other than a mere listing of sources and
authorities are indicated throughout this REvIEw by an asterisk placed after the
footnote number.
Publication of signed contributions from any source does not signify adoption
of the views ex'ressed by the LAW REvIw or its editors collectively.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
Administrative Law-Parties on Appeal from Utilities Commission-
Refusal to Take Judicial Notice of Interest of Affected
Municipality in Discontinuance of Train Service
The Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co. petitioned the North Carolina
Utilities Commission for permission to discontinue certain trains and
passenger service in the eastern part of the state. The city of Kinston
and others' appeared in opposition to the petition. The petition was
allowed, and the protestants filed notice of appeal to the superior court.
Hearing that the railroad intended to discontinue the trains before the
appeal was heard, the' protestants filed a motion before the Superior
The protestants were the City of Kinston, the County of Lenoir, the City of
Greenville, the County of Pitt, the Eastern Carolina Chamber of Commerce, and
the Four County Committee. North Carolina Corporation Commission v. Kinston,
220 N. C. 359, 20 S. E. (2d) 322 (1942).
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Court of Edgecombe County for an order2* directing the railroad to
cease and desist from all efforts to carry into effect the commission's
order. The railroad filed a counter motion to dismiss the protestants'
motion and to dismiss the appeal from the order of the Utilities Com-
mission on the ground that the matter was not properly in the superior
court. However, the protestants' motion was granted, and the railroad
appealed. The Supreme Court of North Carolina held that the motion
of the railroad to dismiss the protestants' appeal should have been
allowed on the ground that the protestants were not entitled to prose-
cute an appeal from the order of the commission, apparently because
the protestants had failed to show sufficient interest to warrant the
appeal. The court said that a party to a hearing must show some
property or property interest involved in order to have the right to
appeal. Judicial notice was not taken of the fact that the trains in
question operated within the protesting towns and counties. It was
said in the opinion, "We are not permitted to refer to matters not stated
in the record, nor could the court below or the jury consider them."3
There is ample authority to support the position that the court will
take judicial notice of facts known to the general public4 when such
facts are material and necessary to the decision.5 In general, a request
for judicial notice is necessary.O However, judicial notice has been
taken of the fact-that railroads operated within certain territories in
cases where neither the fact of the railroad's operation nor a request
was shown. 7
In spite of the lack of showing of a request in the principal case,
it is submitted that the court would not have been in error had it taken
judicial notice of the fact that the trains in question operated within
the protesting towns and counties. Thus the protestants' interest-the
passenger service to which they had been accustomed, and of which
they were being deprived-would have appeared. The action of the
" The railroad contended that even if this case were properly in the superior
court on appeal, the restraining order should not have been granted because:
1. The protestants should bring an independent action aghinst the railroad;
2. If the motion for the order was proper, it should be supported by verified com-
plaint or affidavit; and, 3. The protestants should post bond to protect the railroad.
The railroad had presented affidavits to show that it would suffer serious loss if
the order were granted.
The petitioners argued that the order requested was not in the nature of an
injunction; that, after their appeal was perfected, the jurisdiction of the commis-
sion was shifted by law to the superior court, and there could then be no dis-
continuance of the trains until it was allowed by the court.
'The court was quoting from an opinion by Walker, J., in the case of State v.
Atlantic Coast Line R. R. Co., 149 N. C. 470, 475, 62 S. E. 755, 757 (1908).
' WIGmoRE, EviDENcE (3d ed. 1940) §2571.
'Note (1935) 15 B. U. L. REv. 385.
'WIGmoaE, EVIDEN C (3d ed. 1940) §2568.
7Goodman v. Heilig, 157 N. C. 6, 72 S. E. 866 (1911) ; State ex rel. McCullen
v. Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co., 146 N. C. 568, 60 S. E. 506 (1908).
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court in the principal case is somewhat suggestive of the action in
Riggin v. Collier,8 where the court refused to recognize New Orleans
as a city in Louisiana.
However, the requirement that such an aggrieved municipality must
show a property interest seems to be only technical law serving no good
end. If, as in the instant case, such law is going to lead to the denial
of protection to a city's interest in its transportation, then that law
would be better abolished. The state of the law in North Carolina,
since the principal case, would appear to be that neither individual
citizens of a community nor the community itself may appeal from an
order of the commission. Such law is opposed to the best interest of
the public.
In support of that position in the principal case, the railroad cited
North Carolina Corporation Commission v. Winston-Salem Southbound
Railroad Co.9  That case did hold that the citizens of Winston-Salem
had no right to appeal from a proceeding before the commission re-
garding the relocation of a depot. The fact, however, was apparently
overlooked by the railroad in the principal case that the Winston-Salem
Railroad case involved the entirely different problem of the right of
individual citizens to appeal. The principal problem is the right of
cities and counties, the legal representatives of their people, to appeal.
The court in the Winston-Salem Railroad case argued, as does the
railroad in the principal case, that C. S. §1097 confines the right of
appeal from an order of the commission to a party to the proceeding,
that to be a party a property interest must be shown, and that the
intervenors showed no such interest. They were affected only as citi-
zens of the community and had no more interest than other citizens
who opposed the removal of the depot. The law does not authorize
individual citizens to prosecute an appeal when they have no interest in
the subject matter except that which is common to all. That right,
argued the court, is reserved to the state which acts for all its citizens. 10
To allow such an appeal, it was said, would be to destroy the purpose
of the commission, i.e., instead of decisions by the commission, we
would have decisions by a jury in the locality of the complainant. How-
ever, the fact was ignored that this argument is equally applicable where
86 Mo. 568 (1839); Note (1922) 25 LAw NoTEs 226.
p170 N. C. 560, 87 S. E. 785 (1916).
10* N. C. CODE AxN. (Michie, 1939) §1908: "The cause shall be entitled
'State of North Carolina on relation of the utilities commissioner against (here
insert name of appellant)..'..
In Chief Justice Clark's dissenting opinion in North Carolina Corporation
Commission v. Winston-Salem Southbound Railroad Co., 170 N. C. 560, 572, 87
S. E. 785, 791 (1916), he said, "The mere form of docketing is nothing more
than a formality. The real plaintiffs are the petitioners whose property rights
have been damaged... and who are entitled to have a jury pass on the question"
[Vol. 21
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the appeal is by the railroad. It would appear that the result of the
decision in this case was to deprive the injured protestant of the right
of judicial review of an order refusing him relief, and, on the other
hand, to afford the railroad every opportunity of review.
The case of Southern Public Utilities Co. _v. Charlotte" weakens
the Winston-Salem Railroad case as a precedent against an appeal by
a municipality. There the right of the City of Charlotte to appeal from
an order of the corporation commission allowing an increase of street-
car fares in the city was sustained. Justice Hoke, writing the opinion,
said, speaking of the Winston-Salem Railroad case, "I think I may
safely say that none of the court entertained the view that the right of
appeal in such cases is necessarily restricted to the state and the de-
fendant corporation whose interests are adversely affected."
The Winston-Salem Railroad case is further weakened as a prece-
dent for the railroad in the principal case by a split in the court there
on the matter of the right to appellate review. Two justices, Brown and
Walker, were of the opinion that there was no such right. This posi-
tion was incorporated in the majority opinion written by Justice Brown.
Two justices, Hoke and Allen, concurred in the result only. Justice
Allen made no statement of his opinion, but Justice Hoke felt that
there was a right of appeal, and Chief Justice Clark dissented on that
ground. Thus, if Justice Allen's silence is overlooked, there is an even
split in the court over the question of whether the protestants had. a
right to appeal. If, however, Justice Allen's silence can be interpreted
to mean that he concurred in the result only, or that he coficurred in
the opinion of Justice Hoke, this case could be said to be an authority
against the position of the railroad.
In Chief Justice Clark's dissenting opinion, he pointed out that
the General Assembly has provided 12 that "either party affected" could
appeal, and since it would indeed be a solecism for the commission to
appeal from its own order, this must mean that the right to appeal is
not restricted to the corporation whose interest is affected. However,
it should be noted that the statute to which the Chief Justice referred
is concerned with appeals to the supreme court and not to the superior
court, but a similar provision is made in a statute on" appeals to the
superior court.'3
It is apparent that there is more reason for refusing to allow an
1179 N. C. 151, 166, 101 S. E. 619, 626 (1919).
' N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §1100: "Either party may appeal to the
supreme court from a judgment of the superior court, and the same rules and
regulations are prescribed by law for appeals...."
1 N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §1097: "From all decisions or determina-
tions made by the utilities commissioner, any party affected thereby- shall be
entitled to an appeal.. .. "
1943]
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appeal by an individual citizen than by a municipality. The argument
most generally heard against appeals by individuals is that they would
tend to flood the courts with litigation. However, this argument is
hardly realistic in view of the expense involved. If an occasional suit
by a vigilant citizen were allowed, it might well result in a better pro-
tection of the public interest.
Even if it were conceded that the words of C. S. §1097,14 giving the
right of appeal "to any party affected," constituted a limitation, then
that limitation was removed by C. S. §1112(k),'r ° giving the right of
appeal "to any party ... to the proceeding."
As another basis for a more desirable result in the principal case,
it is suggested that the court could have held the railroad estopped, by
failure to object earlier in the proceeding, from claiming that the
protestants had no sufficient interest. 16
Possibly the best solution to the present uncertain state of the law
in North Carolina is to be found through legislation. A Washington
statute17 extends the: right of appeal to either the commission, any pub-
'& Ibid.5 N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §1112(k) "... from the decision of
said utilities commissioner, or the said utilities commission, any party to said
proceedings may appeal to the superior court. .. "
The first case decided under this statute was Utilities Commission v. Carolina
Coach Co., 216 N. C. 325, 4 S. E. (2d) 897 (1939). The Coach Co. had
petitioned the -commission for removal of certain restrictions in its franchise.
The Greyhound Bus Co. intervened and protested, and the petition was denied.
The Coach Co. appealed, and the protestant moved to dismiss the appeal on the
ground that the order affected no property right of the appellants. It was held
that C. S. §1097 does not confine the right of appeal to matters of property right.
It was also pointed out that C. S. §1112(k) uses the most general language
possible.
The protestants were relying on the Bus Law, N. C. Pub. Laws, c. 136, §8,
saying that appeal lay from an order of the commission to suspend, revoke, alter
or amend _ny franchise of a bus company.' The argument was that since the
commission in this proceeding refused to allow any change in the franchise, no
property right was affected, and no right of appeal lay. The court said, "We do
not believe that: upon,'a fair interpretation" of the law the right of appeal was in-
tended.to be confined to the single instance pointed out, or that appeal in any
other instance is unprovided for by the statute on the theory expressio inius est
exclusio alterius. Such an inferential conclusion would violate the rules of liberal
construction, which we think ought to. be given to procedural laws protecting
property rights." 216 N. C" 325, 328 4 S., E. (2d) 897, 899 (1939), reajlned in
218 N. C 233, 10 S. E. (2d) 824 (140).
116 State v. Rock Island Mbtor Transit Co., 209 Minn. 108, 295 N. W. 519
(1940).
State v. Tri-State Telephone -and. Telegraph Co.; 146 Minn. 247, 178 N. W.
603 (1920); is a case,.whichlmight be said to support the position of the court in
the principal case if the Minnesota case were not based on a statute peculiar to that
state. In that case the city of St. Paul was denied the right of appeal from a
proceeding before the Railroad and Warehouse Commission to determine the
reasonableness of telephone rates. However, it was said that the statute, Gen.
Laws of- Minn 1915, c. 152, §22, gave the right of appeal only to those who have
been made parties by law, -wh6 have a right -to control the proceeding, and who
are bound by the order. The fact that the city was affected by the order did not
make it a party.1 7 Rmsa STATUTEs OF WASHINGTON (Remington, 1931) §10430.
[Vol. 21
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lic service company, or any complainant. Indiana 8 allows appeal by
any person, association, or city adversely affected. In Oklahoma, a
constitutional provision19 gives the right of appeal to any corporation
affected, any person deeming himself aggrieved, or the state.
It seems improbable that the North Carolina legislature intended to
limit the right of appeal as it was limited in the principal case. As is
pointed out above, it appears that the best law is against that holding.20 *
However, the precedents to which the courts must look for guidance in
construing the statutes being as conflicting as they are, it would seem
advisable for the legislature to change the law so as clearly to give the
right of appeal to either the defendant corporation, the state, or any
affected person appearing before the commission and participating in
the hearing regardless of a showing of a property interest.
EDWIN N. MANER, JR.
Constitutional Law-Racial Discrimination-Discriminatory
Salary Schedules of Negro Schoolteachers Prohibited
by Fourteenth Amendment
Plaintiff, a negro schoolteacher, brought an action for a declaratory
judgment as to the legality of the action of the Board of Education of
Nashville, Tennessee, in setting up different schedules of compensation
f6r white and colored teachers of the same professional rating, for in-
junction against such future discrimination, and for past salary alleged
to be due on the basis of the difference between the white and the col-
ored schedules. The federal district court made findings of fact that
the board had followed the schedules, that the only basis for the differ-
ent scales was race or color, and held that such a distinction was a
denial of equal protection of laws and so violated the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. The declaratory judgment and the injunction were granted, but
recovery of back salary was denied because the negro plaintiff had
accepted the smaller amount in the past without protest.1
The instant case provides one more step in the slow advancement of
18 Acts "of Indiana 1927, c. 258, §1.
OKaLA. CoNsT., Art. IX, §20.
'0. Corporation Commission v. Cannon Mfg. Co., 185 N. C. 17, 116 S. E. 178(1923). The Southern Power Co. -petitioned the Corporation Commission to fix
reasonable rates. On the filing of the petition, the commission had notices issued
and served on all customers under contract with the petitioner. Various customers
appeared and objected to the proposed rates. From the commission's decision, the
customers were allowed an appeal. (Appeal dismissed on other grounds.)
In State ex ret. Board of Railroad Commissioners v. Wilmington and Weldon
R. R. Co., 122 N. C. 877, 29 S. E. 334 (1898), the petitioners had begun a pro-
ceeding before the commission to require the railroad to build a station. From
the commission's finding, the petitioners appealed directly to the supreme.court.
It was held that the appeal would lie to the superior court and then to the supreme
court.
'Thomas v. Hibbitts, 46 F. Supp. 368 (M. D. Tenn. 1942).
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